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Brand: Criminal Law - Wyoming Indecent Liberties Statute - Victim Consen

CRIMINAL LAW-Wyoming's Indecent Liberties StatuteVictim Consent is Now a "Relevant Fact for Jury Deliberation;" Did Pierson Put a Bandage on Wyoming's
Criminal Code Bullet Wound? Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d
1119 (Wyo. 1998).
INTRODUCTION

Thirty-six year-old Lewis R. Pierson met CG in May of 1992 when she
was fifteen.' Pierson had gone to visit CG's parents in the hospital after they
were injured in a fire., Later, when CG's parents returned to work, Pierson
would regularly visit the family auto shop., CG was often present because
she was home-schooled and frequently spent her time assisting her father in

the family business.' During this period a "friendship" developed between
CG and Pierson which became more romantic in December of 1992 when
Pierson told CG he "thought he was falling in love with her" and kissed
her.' At that time Pierson was married to his third wife,, while CG had never
had a boyfriend or been allowed to date.7 Over the subsequent months the
physical relationship between the couple intensified, fueled by the fact that
CG's father had moved his business into Pierson's shop in April of 1993.'
The move coincided with Pierson's marital separation.9
CG turned sixteen on May 20, 1993." In June of that year, Pierson accompanied her and her family to a religious meeting in Montana." While on
the trip, during a brief moment alone inside a truck parked outside a shopping mall, the physical relationship between Pierson and CG progressed to
fondling underneath the clothing' 2 and digital penetration." CG and Pierson
also began discussing the possibility of marriage." In preparation for marrying, Pierson sent for CG's birth certificate by impersonating her father on
1. Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wyo. 1998).
2. Id.
Pierson took CG and her younger siblings out for ice cream in an attempt to comfort them. Id
CG's father and Pierson were both auto mechanics and the families attended the same church.
3. Id.
Id.
4. Id.
5. Id
6. Brief of Appellant at 17, Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1998) (No. 96-91) [hereinafter
Brief of Appellant] (on file with Land and Water Law Review). Pierson's first two wives had also been
sixteen at the time of their marriages. Id.
7. Pierson, 956 P.2d at 1121.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Id
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 4.
14. Pierson,956 P.2dat 1121.
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the telephone."
In July of 1993, CG's mother discovered a note written by her daughter
to Pierson referring to him as "lover."16 Despite actions by CG's parents to
forbid further contact between Pierson and CG, the couple continued to
meet surreptitiously at various locales, including the home of CG's grandfather.1 Many of these meetings were initiated by CG."
On July 15, 1993, while CG was visiting a friend in Sheridan, Wyoming, Pierson and CG had sexual intercourse in Pierson's truck." Four other
incidents of sexual intercourse occurred over the next two months. The
charged misconduct in this case took place on August 29, 1993, on the
couch in Pierson's auto shop." After being approached by local law enforcement, CG's parents confronted their daughter and she confessed to
being sexually active with Pierson." Within days the minor's family moved
out of the state." Having learned from CG her new location, Pierson met her
at a motel in Anaconda, Montana on September 11, 1993, and persuaded
CG to run away with him. The next day, the pair left on a fourteen-month
cross-country sojourn that ended only after a fraudulent marriage in Oregon
on CG's seventeenth birthday and Pierson's arrest and extradition back to
Wyoming." At trial CG testified that she had been under Pierson's domination throughout their entire association., Pierson, in contrast, presented witnesses who testified that CG had appeared at all times to be a willing, mature participant in the relationship. 2
On August 4, 1995, Pierson was convicted of one count of taking indecent liberties with a minor in violation of Wyoming Statute section 14-3105.28 The verdict came after a three-day jury trial in Johnson County.29 The

15. Id.at1122.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Brief of Appellant, supranote 6, at 10.
19. Id at 13. No evidence was ever presented that CG's acts were not voluntary.
20. Brief of Appellee at 5, Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1998) (No. 96-91) [hereinafter
Brief of Appellee] (on file with Land and Water Law Review).
21. Id at 5-6. Pierson was now thirty-seven years old. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 6.
22. Brief of Appellee, supra note 20, at 6. Appellee's brief asserts that the police became involved
after a complaint had been made to the Department of Family Services (it is not mentioned who made
the complaint). Id Appellant's brief states that Pierson contacted law enforcement officials after he
heard that CG's family was abusing her. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 13.
23. Brief of Appellee, supranote 20, at 6.
24. Id.at 7-8.
25. Id.at 8.
26. Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Wyo. 1998).
27. Id.
28. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-105 (Michic 1997) provides:
Except under circumstances constituting sexual assault in the first, second or third
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defendant appealed his conviction to the Wyoming Supreme Court. He
challenged, among other issues,' the constitutionality of section 14-3-105,
and the district court's jury instruction that "it is not a defense to the charge
of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a child under the
age of eighteen years that the child consented.", Pierson's claim was predicated on Wyoming Statute section 6-2-304.11 He argued that because a sixteen year-old may legally consent to sexual intercourse under section 6-2304 (the statutory rape statute), CG's consent had a direct bearing on the

relative "indecency" of their activity on August 29, 1993.1 Pierson asserted
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to present a defense because
the consent factor was specifically precluded from the jury's deliberations
by the jury instructions."
Pierson v. State is the first case to directly address this interplay be-

tween sections 6-2-304 and 14-3-105 of the Wyoming Code as it pertains to
jury deliberation." The Wyoming Supreme Court, in a 3-2 opinion, reversed
and remanded the case back to the district court. The court held it was re-

versible error not to instruct the jury that the alleged consent of the sixteen
year-old minor, while not a complete defense to a charge of taking indecent
liberties with a minor, may be relevant to a determination that the defendant
had not engaged in conduct which the "common sense of society would
regard as indecent and improper."' '

This case note traces the development of the indecent liberties statute.
degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any
immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be fined not
less than $100.00 or more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more
than ten years, or both.
As used in this section, 'child' means a person under the age of eighteen years. The statute has been
amended since the events giving rise to Pierson. 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 135, § 2. In the principal
case, the indecent liberties statute had no proviso giving preference to Title Six. Pierson, 956 P.2d at
1123.
29. Pierson, 956 P.2d at 1123. Pierson was sentenced to serve two to four years in the Wyoming
State Penitentiary. That sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for a period of five
years. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 2.
30. Pierson, 956 P.2d at 1120. Pierson also raised issues of prosecutorial misconduct and improper
at 1121.
admission of evidence. Id.
31. Id. at 1124. The defense failed to raise the constitutional issue at trial, however the jury instruction was given over defense objection. Id. at 1123.
32. Wyo. SrAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Michie 1997) provides, in relevant part: "An actor commits sexual
assault in the third degree if: (i) The actor is at least four years older than the victim and inflicts sexual
intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen years." The statute was amended in 1997. 1997 Wyo. Sess.
Laws ch. 135, § 1. Prior to its amendment (a) contained a proviso indicating preference for Title Fourteen that stated, "[e]xcept under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 14-3-105."
33. Pierson, 956 P.2d at 1124.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.at 1129 (quoting Roberts v. State, 912 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Wyo. 1996)).
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The note then examines the Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation of the
interplay of sections 6-2-304 and 14-3-105 of the Wyoming Code and the
court's decision in Pierson v. State to reverse the district court's failure to
correctly instruct the jury on the issue of consent. Finally, this case note
asserts that the Pierson decision, rather than clarifying the law regarding the
interrelationship between the two statutes, exacerbates the latter section's
ambiguity, making it violative of constitutional due process guarantees.
BACKGROUND

History of the Offense of "Indecent Liberties"
In contrast to laws punishing the rape of adult women, which date as
far back as the Code of Hammurabi, laws aimed at curbing sexual contact
between adults and minors have a sparse and inconsistent history in Western
society." Documentation of sex crimes against children during the first few
centuries A.D. is found primarily in religious canons., The first significant
discussion of sexual crimes against children occurred during the maturation
of canon law in the Middle Ages." Teachers of canon law taught that sexual
intercourse with a girl who was under the age of consent to marry was rape
even if the girl consented and failed to protest the intercourse.' The age of
consent has fluctuated greatly throughout history, at times dipping as low as
seven.', However, by the fourteenth century the age of consent was generally accepted as twelve for girls and fourteen for boys.' When an adult's
conduct with a child amounted to sexual contact not involving penetration,
the child's consent typically served as a defense to prosecution.' In 1861,
the English created an offense of "indecent liberties" with children under
sixteen which specifically prohibited any sexual contact with children regardless of the child's consent." At that time, only a few American jurisdictions chose to adopt the 1861 English statute.' The majority of states con37. Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the CriminalLaw: In Search of Reason, 22 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 1,6(1997).

38. Id.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.at 9. There are anomalous English cases in which the defendant was released based upon the
tender years of the victim, but these cases appear to be more a result of the difficulty in interpreting
conflicts between statutes than a recognition that the age of consent was less than ten to twelve. Id.at 10ll.
43. Id.at 11. At that time, if force could not be proven, no other penalty was available. Id.
44. Id.at 12 (referencing Offences against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viet. Ch. 100 §§ 50, 51

(Eng.)).
45. Id.at 17, 136 n.77. The states that adopted the statute at that time were Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Colorado, and Illinois. The judiciaries of both Illinois and Louisiana invalidated their statutes
because they failed to define the crime. See Milne v. People, 79 N.E. 631 (11. 1906); State v. Comeaux,
60 So. 620 (La- 1913).
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tinued to prosecute sexual contact offenses under assault statutes."
"Indecent liberties" is a now somewhat antiquated term that was
commonly used at the beginning of this century in the statutes of many
states. Several state judiciaries claimed the phrase "indecent liberties" was
self-defining.4' In contrast, many jurisdictions seemed to follow the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court, which stated in 1909:
[T]he Legislature employed apt words to describe the offense, because it is evident that the acts constituting the offense mean such
as the common sense of society would regard as indecent and improper .... True, what shall be regarded as "immodest, immoral
and indecent liberties" is not specified with particularity, but that is
not necessary. The indelicacy of the subject forbids it. The common
sense of the community as well as the sense of decency, propriety,
and morality which people generally entertain, is sufficient to apply
the statute to each particular case and point out unmistakably what
particular conduct is rendered criminal by it."
More recently, most legislatures have either moved away from such a
broad definition of the crime and instead specify what acts can be considered "indecent liberties," or have done away with the charge all-together,
replacing it with a comprehensive code of sexual assault." For example, in
contrast to its 1909 Code, Colorado's current statute provides for an offense
of Sexual Assault On a Child: "[a]ny actor who knowingly subjects another
not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a child
if the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four
years older than the victim."' Currently, only three states continue the offense of indecent liberties in its traditionally broad sense: Georgia, North
Carolina, and Wyoming." However, both Georgia and North Carolina in-

46. Phipps, supranote 37, at 17.
47. See State v. Kunz, 97 N.W. 131 (Minn. 1903); State v. Holte, 87 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1957); State

v. MacMillan, 145 P. 833 (Utah 1915); State v. Stuhr, 96 P.2d 479 (Wash. 1939); State v. Hoffman, 2
N.W.2d 707 (Wis. 1942). None of these states continue to include a statutory crime of "indecent liberties" in their criminal codes. Phipps, supra note 37, at 47, 136 n.196.

48. Dekelt v. People, 99 P. 39 (Colo. 1909) (quoted in Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1035
(Wyo. 1979)). See also People v. Healy, 251 N.W. 393 (Mich. 1933); State v. Minns, 454 P.2d 355
(N.M. 1969); Sissom v. State, 360 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1962). Massachusettes has an offense of"inde-

cent assault and battery." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 265 §§ 13B, 13H (West 1998). South Carolina has a
statute that provides a penalty for "lewd and lascivious" contact with a child under sixteen. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-15-140 (Law Co-op. 1997).
49. See MINN. STAT. ANN §§ 609.295, 609.296 (West 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-13 (Michie

1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.1 (1997).
50. COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-405 (West 1998).
51. Phipps, supranote 37, at 136 n.196; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-64 (Supp. 1997) (child molestation

");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14defined as: "any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of any child ....
202.1 (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-105 (Michie 1997).
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elude language within their statutes that provide that the indecent acts must
be done with the purpose to sexually gratify either the actor or the child."
This language has the effect of making the crime of indecent liberties or
child molestation a specific intent crime."
The InterrelationshipBetween the Sexual Assault Statutes and "Indecent
Liberties"
The Wyoming Supreme Court has attempted on several occasions to
clarify the relationship between the sexual assault crimes included in Title
Six of the Wyoming Code and the crime of indecent liberties included in
Title Fourteen.m The defendant in Ketcham v. State argued that section 143-105 (indecent liberties) had been repealed by implication through the enactment of section 6-4-305 (fourth degree sexual assault) and section 6-4504 (child abuse)." Ketcham contended these statutes were more specific
than section 14-3-105 with regard to the prohibited acts, and were inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the indecent liberties statute. 6 The case involved a probation violation for sexual intercourse between the defendant,
previously convicted of burglary, and a fourteen year-old girl." The defendant was three days short of his eighteenth birthday. Consequently, he was
not four years older than the victim as required by section 6-4-305, nor was
he defined as an "adult" as required by section 6-4-504." However,
Ketcham failed to raise the issue of the conflicts between the statutes in the
district court, thus his claim was subject to review under the plain error
standard."
The court held that the defendant failed to show that a clear rule of law
had been violated at the trial level."' The court also noted that the case arose

52. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-64 (Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1 (1997).

53. Specific intent crimes have consistently been upheld against void-for-vagueness constitutional
challenges. See United States v. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, (1978); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945).
54. This issue frequently arose because the penalties for violating section 14-3-105 were much
higher than those for third or fourth-degree sexual assault contained within Title Six. The penalty for a
violation of sections 6-4-305 or 6-4-306 has ranged from one to five years maximum. The maximum
penalty under the indecent liberties statute has remained constant at ten years. The 1997 amendments to
Title Six now provide for a fifteen year maximum penalty for third degree sexual assault. Fourth degree
sexual assault has been repealed. 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 135, § 1.
55. Ketchamv. State, 618 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Wyo. 1980).
56. Id at 1358-59.
57. Id at 1358. The court found it significant that the sexual relationship had been carried out in
spite of the girl's parents' disapproval. The court also points out that the girl left school with Ketcham
and spent four or five days with him at which time her parents called the sheriff and reported her missing. Id.
58. Id at 1359.
59. Id
60. Review under the plain error rule requires that three specific criteria be fulfilled. First, the record
must be clear as to the incident that occurred at trial which is alleged as error. Second, the proponent of
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in the context of a probation revocation. It pointed out that a probationer is
not entitled to the "full panoply of rights"6' that attend a criminal prosecution, such as the reasonable doubt standard.,2 Most interestingly, the court
held that the defendant did not have standing to invoke the plain error rule.
The court noted that section 6-4-305 required a four-year age differential
that did not exist between Ketcham and the minor in question.63 It reasoned

that because Ketcham was not subject to violation of section 6-4-305 he
could not challenge its validity." The dissenting justices, Rose and
McClintock, did not agree with the defendant's repeal by implication argument because legislative intent was not sufficiently clear as to the enactment
of the statutes."' However, they asserted that the two statutes had to be har-

monized in order to come to any proper resolution of the inherent conflict
between the laws." The dissent supported Ketcham's argument that by requiring a four-year age differential to the charge of statutory rape, the legislature had decriminalized the behavior for which he was charged.67 The
dissent noted the obvious contradiction between a sexual assault statute
which provided for a maximum of a one-year jail sentence for consensual

sexual relations with a minor aged twelve to sixteen when consummated
with an actor four years older; and a statute which provided for a maximum
sentence of ten years for (under Sorenson) consensual touching of the
clothed breast of a girl under eighteen." The dissent also pointed out that no
exception was provided for cases where the defendant was younger than the
victim.69
In McArtor v. State the majority held that "such child" in the statute
prohibiting indecent liberties with a minor referred to an immediately pre-

ceding characterization of a child as one under the age of eighteen years,
the rule must demonstrate a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Third, the proponent must
prove that a substantial right has been violated and that the defendant has been materially prejudiced by
that violation. These requirements must be fulfilled even if constitutional rights are involved. Id. (quoting Madrid v. State, 592 P.2d 709, 710 (Wyo. 1979)).
61. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1361.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1363 (Rose, J., dissenting). While section 14-3-105 was enacted first in 1957, it was
amended in 1978-following the enactment of sections 64-301 to 6-4-313. 1978 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.

25, § 1.
66. Ketcham, 618 P.2d at 1363 (Rose, J., dissenting).
67. Id. The dissent pointed out the similarity between Wyoming's statute and the Model Penal Code.
The MPC states that the rationale of statutory rape is victimization of immaturity. It claims the most
convenient way to give effect to the victimization rationale is to require a substantial age differential in
favor of the male. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(1) discussion on section (Fourth Tentative
Draft 1955)).
68. Id. The dissent also made reference to the well-established rule that if it was unclear under
Wyoming Statutes that Ketcham's acts were criminal, any doubts should be resolved in favor of leniency. Id. at 1366 (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980)).
69. Id.
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therefore the statute could not be said to be inapplicable on the basis that the

sixteen year-old victim did not qualify under the age requirement." The
facts of the case involved consensual sexual intercourse between a girl five
months shy of her seventeenth birthday and her adult supervisor in the police cadet program in which she was a member.7' The court held that the
enactment of section 6-2-304 (statutory rape) did not repeal the indecent
liberties statute by implication." The majority pointed to the cross-

referencing of section 14-3-105 within section 6-2-304 of the Wyoming
Code to reject McArtor's repeal by implication argument.7"
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the statutory rape
statute should have been applied as a special statute which must govern over

the general indecent liberties statute.,, The court explained that the defendant's urged rule of construction is only appropriate to determine legislative
intent." The court noted legislative intent had already been determined by
other means, and further, it was not immediately discernible which of the
two statutes was more specific."

Justices Rose and Cardine each filed dissenting opinions. Justice Rose
held to his position in Ketcham that Wyoming did not prohibit the sort of
consensual sexual activity involved in the appeal, finding that the sexual

assault statutes defined the criminality of sexual activity between persons
over the age of fifteen or less than four years apart." Justice Cardine ob-

served that to construe the statute in the manner required by the majority
would mean that consensual sexual intercourse between a boy eighteen
years-old and a girl one day short of her eighteenth birthday was immoral,
immodest, and indecent and may constitute a felony punishable by ten years
in prison. ' He argued that the result from that construction of the statute

was clearly contrary to the legislative intent found in the adoption of the

70. McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1985). At that time, the statute did not specifically
provide a definition stating that "child" shall be defined as a person under age eighteen. WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-105 (1957).
71. McArtor, 699 P.2d at 292 n.2.
72. Id at 293.
73. Id. The court pointed to the amendment of section 6-2-304 in 1984, which stated to apply that
offense "except under circumstances constituting section 14-3-105." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Michie 1985). This language has since been repealed by the 1997 amendments which 1) eliminated the
proviso under section 6-2-304, and 2) added to section 14-3-105 the proviso "[e]xcept under circumstances constituting sexual assault in the first, second, or third degree as defined by W.S 6-2-302 through
6-2-304." 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws. ch. 135, §§ 1-2.
74. McAlror, 699 P.2d at 293-94.
75. Id
76. Id. The court pointed to the fact that sexual intrusion is an element of sexual assault, while a
special onus was placed on parents, guardians and custodians under indecent liberties. That special
burden language has since been repealed. 1978 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 25, § 1.
77. McArtor, 699 P.2d at 295 (Rose, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 296 (Cardine, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol34/iss1/9

8

Brand: Criminal Law - Wyoming Indecent Liberties Statute - Victim Consen

1999

CASE NOTE

sexual assault statutes."
The court in Campbell v. State was forced to revisit the age of the victim as required under section 14-3-105 because the statute had been
amended in 1978.80 The court ruled that based upon various statutes in pari
materia," the age of the minor victim required by the statute was now under
nineteen years.4 Justice Cardine and Justice Rose filed a specially concurring opinion in which they noted that even if the indecent liberties statute is
applied narrowly to cases not covered under a sexual assault statute, its application still creates unfairness.,3
In Derksen v. State the court held that the crime of taking immodest,
immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor could not be a lesser-included
offense of second degree sexual assault." Derksen was tried for second de-

gree sexual assault for tying the hands of his ten year-old stepdaughter, fondling her, and forcing her to touch and fellate his penis." He was convicted
of the lesser-included offense of taking indecent liberties with a minor and
sentenced to nine to ten years in the penitentiary. The court said that in

Wyoming an offense is "necessarily included" in the charged offense when
"the elements of the lesser offense are identical to part of the elements of
the greater offense."'1 The court found that indecent liberties cannot be a
lesser included offense of second degree sexual assault because the indecent

liberties statute covers conduct much broader than the sexual intrusion required by the sexual assault statue. n

79. Id.
80. Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425, 426 (Wyo. 1985); 1978 Wyo. Sess. Laws. ch. 25, § 1.
81. Inparimateria means upon the same matter or subject. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 544 (6th ed.
materia" are those relating to the same thing or having a common purpose.
abr. 1991). Statutes "in pari
This rule of statutory construction, that statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read,
construed and applied together so that the legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the
enactments, applies only when the particular statute is ambiguous. Id
82. Campbell, 709 P.2d at 428. Because of the amendment, the court was unable to use the statutory
construction it had utilized in McArtor. The incidents underlying McArtor took place prior to the 1978
amendment. Id. at 426.
83. Id at 429 (Cardine, J., specially concurring).
84. Derksen v. State, 845 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 1993).
85. Id. at 1385.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1386 (quoting State v. Selig, 635 P.2d 786, 790 (Wyo. 1981)).
88. As previously noted, section 14-3-105 has been held to apply to sexual intrusion, sexual contact,
and consensual sexual intercourse. See McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1985); Montoya v. State,
822 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1981); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1979). Perhaps the most extreme
interpretation of the statute took place in Roberts v. State, 912 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1996). The court held
that Roberts had violated his probation by engaging in indecent liberties. His acts constituted jumping
into bed with his thirteen year-old daughter and nuzzling her neck and mouth with his nose. Id at 1112.
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Voidfor Vagueness Challenges to Section 14-3-105 ofthe Wyoming Code
The Wyoming Supreme Court has addressed several challenges to the
constitutionality of the indecent liberties statute over the past nineteen
years.89 These challenges were predicated upon the doctrine that a criminal
law will violate due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments if
it fails either of two tests. A law may be void-for-vagueness if "it fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute" or "if it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions."" The first twin essential of due process is violated
by a statute which "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." The second essential, which discourages arbitrary application of a statute, requires that the standards of enforcement be sufficiently precise in order to avoid "involving so many factors of varying effect that whether the person to decide in advance nor the
jury after the fact can safely and certainly judge the result."'2 Implicit within
the void-for-vagueness doctrine is also a notion that the separation of powers commands the courts to invalidate improperly framed legislation."
The Wyoming Supreme Court first rejected a facial, void-forvagueness constitutional challenge to section 14-3-105 in Sorenson v.
State.- The court held that "liberties" are what the common sense of society
would regard as indecent or improper." The court also found that a person
of ordinary intelligence can weigh his contemplated conduct against a prohibition of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties against a child
and know whether or not such contemplated conduct is proscribed by it."
The court stated that it agreed with a Kentucky court that had said, "[w]e
believe that citizens who desire to obey the statute will have no difficulty in

89. See Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113 (Wyo. 1996); Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359 (Wyo. 1993);

Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1988); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988); Sorenson v. State,
604 P.2d 1031 (1979).
90. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (invalidating a Florida vagrancy
statute and establishing the current standard for determining whether a given statute is 'void-for-

vagueness').
91. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925).
92. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445,465 (1927).
93. The concept that is operative here is that a vague statute violates the separation of powers by

passing the legislature's job to the judiciary. Joseph E. Bauerschmid, Mother ofMercy-Is This the Endof
RICO?-Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for- Vagueness Challenge to RICO 'Pattern D,' 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106, 1114 (1990).

94. Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1979). Sorenson was convicted of one count of indecent
liberties for rubbing the breasts of a twelve year-girl through her clothing while also attempting to unbutton her shirt. Id. at 1032.

95. Id. at 1034 (quoting People v. Healy, 251 N.W. 393 (Mich. 1933)).
96. Id. at 1035.
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understanding it."The Sorenson court, while deciding that the statute gave
sufficient notice to be constitutional, completely failed in its opinion to apply the necessary second prong of due process analysis.'" The court did not
determine whether section 14-3-105 encouraged arbitrary arrests and convictions by "failing to give judges and juries precise standards with which to
ascertain the offense."" Following Sorenson, the Wyoming Supreme Court
has summarily denied
frequent "as applied" void-for-vagueness challenges
00
to section 14-3-105.1
PRINCIPAL CASE
The Wyoming Supreme Court identified four issues that Lewis Pierson
raised on appeal.1'° After recounting several pages of facts, the court began
its analysis by pointing out that because Pierson had not raised his constitutional challenge at the' 2trial level those claims must be reviewed under a
"plain error standard."' The court rejected Pierson's claim that the indecent
liberties statute as applied to the facts of his case was unconstitutionally
vague.0'° The court stated that a statute is unconstitutional if it fails to give a
person of ordinary sensibility fair notice that the contemplated conduct is
forbidden,04 and the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary and discrimina-

97. Id. at 1035 (quoting Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 194,110 (1972)).
98. Sorenson v. State,
604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1979).
99. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927). The Supreme Court has, from time to time,
expressed a preference for one of the prongs over the other. In Kolender v. Lawson the Court stated:
although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of vagueness
doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Clearly, Wyoming's indecent liberties statute would fail
this prong of the analysis, as it sets no ascertainable standards for adjudication, and no minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
100. See Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113 (Wyo. 1996); Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359 (Wyo. 1993);
Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1988); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988).
101. Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wyo. 1998). This note concentrates on the issues of
whether an improper jury instruction deprived Pierson of his constitutional right to present a defense and
whether the indecent liberties statute was void-for-vagueness as applied to the facts of the case. The
defendant also raised issues of prosecutorial misconduct and improper admission of evidence. Id. at
1120.
102. Id. at 1123.
To establish 'plain error' first the record must clearly present the incident alleged to

be error. Second, appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of
law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable way. Last, appellant
must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice
against him.
Id (quoting Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 1987)).
103. Id. at 1124.

104. Id.at 1123 (quoting Britt v. State, 742 P.2d 426, 428 (Wyo.1988)).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1999

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 34 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 9

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIV

tory enforcement of the statute.'5 Pierson argued a person of ordinary intelligence would not know that consensual intercourse with a sixteen year-old
was in and of itself proscribed because the age of consent (for statutory rape
purposes) is sixteen and because his intentions were not indecent.16
The court rejected this argument by stating that Pierson failed to take
into account legal precedent and the evidence presented by the State.""7 The
court cited multiple cases where an adult was convicted of taking indecent
liberties with a minor who was sixteen."' The court emphasized the State's
evidence that CG was an inexperienced fifteen year-old who lived with her
parents and had never had a boyfriend when the relationship began.'' CG
testified that she was overwhelmed by the married, thirty-six year-old Pierson's advances. Pierson had investigated the law and knew that Wyoming
did not allow marriage to a person under eighteen without parental consent,
and he knew that CG's parents disapproved of their relationship. Pierson
had also told the law enforcement officer who interviewed him that he had
been warned, "he'd be in trouble.""' The court held that Pierson had fair
notice that a sexual relationship with an inexperienced sixteen year-old,
consummated in deliberate disregard of her parents interdiction, and while
still legally married to another, is prohibited conduct in Wyoming.' The
court also noted that there was no evidence of arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement of the statute."]
After rejecting Pierson's constitutional challenge, the court held that
Pierson had been denied his right to due process through an improper jury
instruction."' The court compared the indecent liberties statute (section 143-105) and the statutory rape statute (section 6-2-304) in pari materia and
determined that the legislature intended the conduct under "indecent liberties" to be more culpable than that required under the statutory rape
statute."'4 The court stated that it "found no logical support for the State's
contention that consensual sexual intercourse between an adult and a minor
over the age of fifteen, without more, is sufficient to convict a defendant of

105. Id (quoting Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 198)).
106. 1d at 1123-24.

107. Id at 1124.
108. Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113 (Wyo. 1996); Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359 (Wyo. 1993); Scad-

den v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987); McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1985).
109. Pierson,956 P.2d at 1124.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.

113. Id. at 1125.
114. Id At that time section 6-2-304 provided for a maximum sentence of five years while section 143-105 provided for a maximum sentence often years. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-304, 14-3-105 (Michie
1996). Section 6-2-304 has since been amended to provide for a maximum sentence of fifteen years.
1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 135, § 1.
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taking indecent liberties with a minor."' I'
The court further noted that the legal age of consent designated by section 6-2-304 does not resolve the question of whether the victim, in fact,
gave an informed consent to the charged conduct." Nor does it resolve the
question as to whether the conduct, even if consensual, was indecent or immoral."' Specifically the court announced that because the term "indecent
liberties" relies on the common sense of society, and members of the jury
will exercise that common sense, they must be allowed to consider the totality of the circumstances relating to the culpability of the defendant's conduct."' The "consent" must also be considered in light of the facts relevant
to the victim's ability to give informed consent."' These facts include the
victim's relative maturity, age, experience, the extent of the minor's parental involvement, and any evidence of the defendant's manipulation or coercion of the minor.'2 The court concluded that the minor's consent is relevant, and it is up to the jury to determine whether the minor's consent made
a defendant's conduct indecent and improper as the common sense of society would regard it."'
The dissent argued that Pierson's conviction should be upheld under
the doctrine of stare decisis.'" The dissent asserted that precedent demonstrated without any equivocation that the offenses proscribed in the two
statutes are distinct from one another, and that the majority erred in blurring
that distinction by suggesting that a defense under the statutory rape statute
(consent) could be a partial defense under the indecent liberties statute.2"
Justice Taylor, with whom Justice Golden joined, stated that it was apparent
that a clear rule of law emanating from McArtor had been undercut to such
a degree as to overrule McArtor"4 He argued that sexual intercourse with a
child is a violation of the indecent liberties statute and stated that particular
societal position is not affected by the defense of consent under the sexual
assault statutes12s However, because the three-member majority of the court
found reversible error, the case was remanded back to the district court for
further adjudication.

115. Pierson,956 P.2d at 1125.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id. at 1128.

122. Id. at 1129 (Taylor, J., dissenting). "'Stare decisis: to abide by or adhere to, decided cases."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 978 (6th ed. abr. 1991).

123. Pierson,956 P.2d. at 1130.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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ANALYSIS

By adopting Wyoming Statute section 14-3-105 as part of the "Child
Protective Act of 1957," the Wyoming Legislature recognized the traumatic,
corrosive, and continuing harm that befalls both individuals and a society
when its children are sexually molested.12 ' The indecent liberties statute is an
admirable attempt to protect the children of Wyoming from sexual abuse
and exploitation. Since its adoption, the statute has been used extensively in
every county in Wyoming.127 Raw statistics outline the extent of the statute's
application throughout the state.'
Considering the statute's broad usage, the court's decision in Pierson
will undoubtedly have especially far-reaching impact upon the state's
criminal adjudications. Pierson v. State was a long overdue attempt by a
supreme court majority to read Wyoming's statutes which cover sexual
conduct with minors in pari materia. However, while the court did finally
seek to harmonize the relevant statutes, its decision may serve to further
exacerbate the very real due process issues already associated with any application of section 14-3-105.
The court decided that the jurors in Pierson had not been properly instructed as to the state of the law when they were told through Jury Instruction nine that, "it is not a defense to the charge of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a child under the age of eighteen years that
the child consented."'2 9 Ironically, this instruction is actually taken from the
Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions.' 3° Nevertheless, the court was correct in

126. Many studies have indicated that sexually abused children suffer from psychological symptoms
ranging from anxiety, nightmares, aggression, depression, sexually inappropriate behavior, and selfinjurious behavior. Phipps, supra note 37, at 83-84. Adult survivors of sexual abuse suffer from sexual
dysfunction, anxiety, fear, depression, and revictimization. Phipps, supra note 37, at 90-92. The physical
effects on children can also be devastating, ranging from permanent bodily injury to pregnancy and
sexually transmitted diseases. Phipps, supra note 37, at 87.
127. At least 1,639 charges of "indecent liberties with a child" have been adjudicated in Wyoming
since the State of Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigations has begun keeping its databasesome ten years after the adoption of the statute. This number is comprised only of those charges in which
the party was arrested for "indecent liberties" regardless of the ultimate outcome of the charge. This
number does not include arrests for other acts which at some point in pre-adjudication were changed to
charges of "indecent liberties." Adding those numbers would no doubt greatly enlarge the total. This raw
information was acquired and tabulated from data gathered from fingerprints on file. Interview with
Dawn Kelly, Records Analyst, Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigations, in Cheyenne, Wyo.
(August 27, 1998).
128. Id.
The effectiveness of the statute as a prosecutorial tool is undisputed and obviously that factor
must be considered relevant in making a determination as to section 14-3-105's overall validity within
Wyoming's Criminal Code. However, other guiding principles of law must also be given due consideration in making a definitive assessment of a statute's legitimacy.
129. Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Wyo. 1998).
130. Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions no. 23.07 (1997). Furthermore, whether the statement correctly reflects the law it is semantically accurate. A minor cannot consent to an "indecent" act any more
than an adult can consent to being battered. Rather it is the consent of the victim that negates the offense
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determining that when a minor is old enough to give consent under the sexual assault statutes, that fact is material in determining whether the defendant's acts were, in fact, "indecent." The doctrine of reading ambiguous
statutes in pari materia requires that those statutes that relate to the same
subject matter should be read, construed, and applied together so that the
legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.'3'
Clearly, third degree sexual assault (statutory rape) relates to indecent liberties in that both statutes provide penalties for sexual intercourse with minors.'3 2 In most states, where criminal codes on the subject are comprised
only of comprehensive sexual assault statutes, sexual intercourse with a
minor over the age of consent is not a crime. 3' The act is certainly not "indecent" per se. This is the interpretation that Justices Cardine and Rose attempted to give to section 14-3-105 in Ketcham v. State, McArtor v. State,
and Campbell v. State. -These justices took the view that the legislature had
essentially decriminalized sex with minors over sixteen, or sex between
parties closer than four years apart in age, by its adoption of section 6-2304.'", This position is logical given the plain language contained within the
statutory rape statute that establishes both an age differential and a victim
age of under sixteen."" A reading of section 14-3-105 that would have apby the sexual
plied the statute only when the conduct was not contemplated
7
assault statutes would appear to have been rational."1
However, for years the legislature continued to amend the indecent
liberties statute without substantially changing its content, which would
indicate a continued approval of the section."' Further, as a practical matter,
a large portion of culpable sexual conduct that occurred with a minor over
the age of sixteen could'not be prosecuted under any other statute. If the acts
did not rise to the level of sexual assault in the second degree,' 39 or did not
itself.
131. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 544 (6th ed. abr. 1991).

132. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-304, 14-3-105 (Michie 1997).
133. Phipps, supra note 37, at 60-61, 136 n.242.
134. Ketcham v. State, 618 P.2d 1356, 1362-66 (Wyo. 1989) (Rose, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State,
709 P.2d 425, 427-29 (Wyo. 1985) (Rose, J., specially concurring); McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288, 29499 (Wyo. 1985) (Rose, J., dissenting), (Cardine, J., dissenting).
135. See supra note 132.
136. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Michie 1997) provides in part, that if a person more than four
years older than a minor, who is fifteen years old or younger, engages in sexual intercourse with the
minor, the actor commits third degree sexual assault Id.
137. This reading has, in fact, finally occurred through the 1997 amendment to the statute. 1997 Wyo.
Sess. Laws ch. 135, § 2. Now, it would appear that indecent liberties can only be applied under circumstances which do not constitute first, second, or third degree sexual assault However, this interpretation
of the amendments may not be shared by Wyoming prosecutors. In the recent case of State v. Robinson
adjudicated in Albany County in September of 1998, the defendant was convicted of indecent liberties
for acts, which if proven, constituted third degree sexual assault. The defendant was over four years
older than the minor who was under age sixteen. Robinson v. State, CR-62-77 (Sept. 9, 1998).
138. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-105 has been amended in 1977, 1978, 1984, 1996 and 1997.
139. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303 (Michie 1997).
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include incest," ° indecent liberties was the only offense that a prosecutor
could charge. Most significantly, the 1984 amendment to the third degree
sexual assault statute specifically conditioned its application to circumstances other than those constituting a violation of section 14-3-105.' This,
in all practicality, had the effect of writing third degree sexual assault out of
existence.142 After all, indecent liberties has been applied to behavior ranging
from sexual contact through clothing, to sexual intrusion, to consensual
sexual intercourse with victims up to the age of eighteen.1'" The statute has
also been applied to sexual intercourse between two minors who were less
than four years apart in age."
In Roberts v. State, a probation revocation case, the statute had even
been applied by the district court to a defendant who jumped on his thirteen
year old daughter's bed in the morning, rubbed her side and nuzzled her
neck and mouth with his nose."' The supreme court concluded that the evidence supported the factual conclusion that Roberts' acts were indecent as
contemplated by the statute."6 The court went on to say, "[i]t is not necessary that the minor's private parts be subjected to the misconduct and some
acts which may not be indecent in themselves may be made so by words
and circumstances.' 4 This language emphasizes that the analysis for a conviction under section 14-3-105 is a very fact specific one. Ironically, the
proper question might be: are there any acts that the Wyoming Supreme
Court is prepared to say are absolutely not contemplated as indecent by the
statute?
The majority in Pierson stated that it "finds no logical support for the

State's contention that consensual sexual intercourse between an adult and a
minor over the age of fifteen, without more, is sufficient to convict a defen-

dant of taking indecent liberties with a minor."", Perhaps the pertinent
question is what circumstance would the supreme court consider "more" for

140. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-402 (Michie 1997).

141. 1984 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch.44, § 2 (emphasis added).
142. Greg Phillips, State Senator from Evanston, used this expression when discussing his reasons for
sponsoring the 1997 amendments to both sections 6-2-304 and 14-3-105. Telephone Interview with Greg

Phillips, state senator (August 28, 1998). The amendments condition the application of indecent liberties
only under circumstances not constituting third degree sexual assault rather than vise-versa, finally
recognizing the position urged by Justices Rose, Cardine, and MeClintock. (It is also a condition that the

circumstances not constitute first or second degree sexual assault).
143.
144.
145.
146.

See supra note 88.
Ketcham v.State, 618 P.2d 1356 (Wyo. 1989).
Roberts v. State, 912 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1996).
Id.at 1112. The standard the court was applying was the high one of "abuse of discretion" on the

part of the trial court. Further, Roberts was on probation after being convicted of indecent liberties with a
minor. Id
147. Id.

148. Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 1998) (emphasis added). As the dissent points out,
defendants have been convicted of indecent liberties under just those very circumstances. Id. at 1129.
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purposes of determining whether section 14-3-105 has been violated. Following Pierson, "more" would seem to include a large age gap between the
defendant and the minor, the fact that the conduct began while the defendant
was still married, and the fact that the defendant was aware that the minor's
parents disapproved of the relationship. This last factor appears to be especially significant to the court and is often prominently mentioned in other
decisions applying the statute. "'
The dissent asserted that the majority's opinion in Pierson overruled
precedent."" This would appear to be true. However, while the Pierson dissent asserted that McArtor was the overruled case, one might argue that the
facts in McArtor were substantially different than those of Pierson. In
McArtor the older male was in a supervisory position over the minor cadet
in his command, and the sexual intercourse took place while the pair were
actually on patrol."' Further, at that time section 14-3-105 placed a special
onus on those who supervised minors."2 However, the facts in Moore v.
State, a 1996 case, are very similar to those in Pierson.'" In Moore, the
thirty year-old defendant and the sixteen year-old minor (KJ) had run away
in an attempt to marry. " Unable to find a state where this was possible, the
pair returned to Wyoming.' The relationship ended and the minor soon
discovered she was pregnant."' The State charged Moore with two counts of
indecent liberties, one with KJ and one with her seventeen year-old successor.' The defendant pleaded nolo contendere to one charge and the other
was dismissed."' The supreme court rejected Moore's appeal by stating, "we
have already eliminated marriage as a plenary defense to a violation of section 14-3-105 and note that the consent of KJ was vitiated by her minority
and consequent lack of capacity to consent."'' Certainly that language ap-

149. Perhaps the court sees the defendant's interference with the parent-child relationship as an aggravating circumstance to the charged sexual misconduct. The Supreme Court has recognized "the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing." Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Some circuits

have describe a parents' right as a fundamental protected privacy and liberty interest in family and child
rearing. See McCollester v. Keene, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982).
150. McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1985).

151. Id.
152. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-105 (Michie 1977). The language that imposed a special burden on

adults in authority has since been repealed. 1978 Wyo. Sess. Laws. ch. 25, § 1.
153. Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Wyo. 1996).
154. Id.
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1116. Moore had argued that the statute was vague as applied to his conduct because had

he and the sixteen year-old victim been married, no prosecution would have occurred. Id.at 1115. The
court rejected this argument by emphasizing section 6-2-307 of the Wyoming Code which eliminates
marriage as a complete defense to sexual assault. The court held, afortiari,that the fact of marriage is
also unavailing as a defense to the crime of indecent liberties. Id, This reasoning seems superficial.
Section 6-2-307 was enacted with the purpose of eliminating marriage as an absolute common law
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pears to be overruled by Pierson."6
The dissent's dispute with the majority's position in Pierson appears to
turn less on whether consent is a defense to the charge of indecent liberties
that they
and more on whether it should be. The dissent seems to indicate
°
would be more comfortable with a black letter per se rule:' 6
Sexual intercourse with a child is a violation of the indecent liberties statute. That societal opinion is not affected by the defense of

consent under the sexual assault statutes, and there is no valid purpose to be accomplished in this case, other than attempting to resof his conduct proscribed by the
cue Pierson from the consequences
2
indecent liberties statute."6

In contrast, the majority held that the conflicting language of section 62-304 could not be ignored in an application of section 14-3-105 to deter-

mine whether the legislature actually intended the law to cover the defen-

dant's conduct. 163 The dissenting Justices in Piersonerred by failing to admit
that a sixteen year-old's voluntary participation in sexual intercourse is expressly recognized by Wyoming statutes and therefore must be relevant in

determining whether an adult's behavior with that minor was "indecent" or
"immoral" and thus, criminal.

Pierson v. State is an example of a case that demonstrates the vagueness and ambiguity inherent within the poorly written indecent liberties

statute. While the supreme court has said that "[the Wyoming Constitution]
will not tolerate a criminal law so lacking in definition that each defendant
is left to the vagaries of individual judges and juries,"" that appears to be

defense to forcible sexual assault. No longer would the fact of marriage serve as a type of perpetual
consent on the part of one spouse to acquit the other of any charge of rape. With regard to indecent
liberties, marriage would seem to abrogate some part of the indecency or immorality of the conduct. The
application of one
differing purposes of the two statutes in question would appear to make an a fortiari
to the other inappropriate.
160. Interestingly, the court says that marriage is not a defense to the charge. Id. at 1116. However,
one could argue that consensual sexual intercourse between a married couple, though comprised of an
adult and a minor over age sixteen, is not contemplated as indecent by the statute. When 1) the minor's
parents have given written consent to marry as allowed by section 20-1-102, and 2) the relationship was
formalized by sectarian or legal authorities. Alternatively, the statute as applied in that case may not
survive the strict scrutiny that would be required if its application would impinge on the fundamental
right of marital privacy suggested in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This scenario does,
however, lend support to an equal protection argument. A minor with parents who will consent to marriage give a complete defense to their child's adult partner, while a minor whose parents refise to consent to marriage leave their child's adult partner open to criminal penalties of up to ten years in prison.
161. Aperse rule, such as that found within the statutory rape statute, would certainly eliminate many
of the problems currently associated with the application of the indecent liberties statute.
162. Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1130 (Wyo. 1998) (Taylor, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1125.
164. Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967,
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precisely what section 14-3-105 requires, perhaps even more so after the
Pierson decision. Each prosecutor, then judge or jury decides on an ad hoc
basis whether the defendant has engaged in conduct that "the common sense
of society would regard as indecent and improper.""'6 No guidance is given
to these officials by the legislature to help them determine even the outer
parameters of the contemplated offense.
A stark illustration of this lack of guidance occurs in Pierson.Many of
the objections at the trial level involved whether individual witnesses should
be able to testify regarding their beliefs and the beliefs of their community
about much older men marrying minor girls. ' " The supreme court said in
Pierson that the district court committed error when (in ruling on an objection of this type) it stated, "the problem is we're not talking about a societal
standard here. We're talking about one particular incident and it constitutes
a violation of our statutes, so the objection is sustained on that point."' 7
First, the Wyoming supreme court found that the trial court's statement misstated the law."6 The very definition of the offense of indecent liberties incorporates a societal standard.' Secondly, the reviewing court also found
that the judge's remarks might have inadvertently indicated that the trial
court believed the prosecution had proven its case.'
There is a more disturbing truth revealed by the district court's statement that illuminates the shortcomings of an incorporation of a societal
standard within a criminal code. The judge may have believed that the statute was violated, but the jurors were free to return an acquittal. While that is
essentially true in any criminal adjudication; in a case interpreting a societal
standard the jury would in essence have determined that the acts were not
"indecent" or "improper," in Johnson County. So, would a county attorney
then be unable to bring a similar charge against the next "Lewis Pierson?"
After all, the people of Johnson County would have spoken, in effect finding that those particular acts are not indecent by their societal standard. Alternatively, are we to believe that society's standard shifts from jury to jury,
or case by case? If so, what happens to the principles of continuity, clarity,
certainty and constructive notice hoped for within the state's criminal justice system?
In delineating its new "consent as a partial defense" parameters, the Pi-

968 (Wyo. 1963)).
165. Id.at 1035.
166. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 32.
167. Pierson,956 P.2d at 1127.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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erson court stated that in determining whether a minor gave meaningful
consent, a jury may look at several factors. 7' They include: the victim's
relative maturity, experience, 2 emancipation status, extent of parental involvement in the minor's decisions, and evidence of the defendant's manipulation or coercion of the minor.' These factors are simply more ambiguities that exacerbate the jury's attempt to determine "indecency."
If the minor were promiscuous, but the parents were very involved in
the minor's life, and the adult defendant was aware that the parents disapproved of the relationship, would that make the conduct indecent? If the
minor were a virgin but emancipated, and the adult was only three years and
eleven months older than the minor, would that be indecent conduct? If the
parties were nine years apart but the evidence showed the minor was unquestionably the sexual aggressor would that mean that the defendant had
violated the indecent liberties statute? The factors that the Pierson court
articulates can be incessantly analyzed in various combinations. Moreover,
the hypotheticals illustrate certain due process problems arising from the
court's decision. In a borderline case, because there is no definitive prior
notice, the court's disregarded ad hoc after-analysis by a jury-4 is the only
way one could know with absolute certainty whether one's contemplated
conduct is a violation of section 14-3-105.
Conceivably, two seventeen year-olds who engaged in heavy petting
after the prom could both be charged with, and convicted for, taking "indecent liberties with a minor." If a prosecutor and subsequently a jury determined that those acts were indecent and immoral by the standards of their
society, the minors could each be sentenced to a maximum sentence of ten
years in prison. Of course, one might say, how ludicrous-no prosecutor
would bring that charge. However, as extreme as the example is, it illustrates the fact that the Wyoming legislature has left the determination of the
parameters of the offense of "indecent liberties" solely up to the other
branches of government.
After Pierson, in defending a case of indecent liberties through "consent as a partial defense" it appears that a defendant must now show three
things. First, that the minor had capacity to give consent to the sexual contact based upon the Pierson factors. Second, that the minor did actually con171. Id.
172. Does this mean prior sexual experience? Wyoming's rape shield statute at section 6-2-312 only
specifically mentions the sexual assault statutes, and any "lesser included offenses." The court has determined that term does not include the indecent liberties statute. Derksen v. State, 845 P.2d 1383 (Wyo.
1993). However, amending section 6-2-312 to include section 14-3-105 would fulfill the goals and
purpose of the rape shield law, if this factor begins to be used as a defense to the charge.
173. Pierson,956 P.2d at 1126.
174. See supranote 164.
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sent to the sexual contact. And last, that the conduct between the defendant
and the minor was not "indecent" or "immoral" as defined by their society's
standard. It is an arguable point whether the Pierson decision will actually
benefit criminal defendants.
The 1997 Amendments to the CriminalCode
Perhaps some of the problems associated with the application of the
indecent liberties statute may have been eliminated by the legislature's 1997
amendments. Both Wyoming Code sections 14-3-105 and 6-2-304 were
altered.'" It remains to be seen whether these 1997 amendments will have
any substantive effect, in practice, on the application of the statutes. The
amendments did two things, 1) provide that the indecent liberties statute can
only be applied in circumstances not constituting first, second, or third degree sexual assault,'17 and 2) remove the provision that third degree sexual
assault can only be applied in circumstances not constituting indecent liberties.'" These enactments would seem to go a long way toward rationalizing
Wyoming's criminal code on sex crimes. The legislative changes attempt to
reverse the swallowing effect that section 14-3-105 previously had on section 6-2-304 when the statutes were applied as written.'7' One can now infer
that indecent liberties is not comprised of those acts which make up the sexual assault statutes. However, prosecutors still appear to prefer to pursue
charges under the indecent liberties statute even though the penalty for third
degree sexual assault has been greatly increased from a maximum sentence
7
of five to fifteen years.'"
Unfortunately, the amendments still don't define the crime and thus
leave available prosecution under section 14-3-105 for all of the most borderline cases; those types of cases that cannot be brought under Title Six.
For example, cases where 1) the parties are less than four years apart, 2) the
minor is above age sixteen, or 3) the actor and victim are both minors." °
These "hard cases" illustrate the dire need for greater guidance and speci-

175. 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 135, § 1-2.
176. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-105 (Michie 1997).

177. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Michie 1997).
178. See supranote 88 and accompanying text
179. See supra note 137. As mentioned previously, this appears to have been the case in Robinson v.
State. Robinson v. State, CR-6277 (Albany County, Sept. 9, 1998). Perhaps this is because indecent
liberties, comprised mainly of a societal standard, rather than elements that must be proven, is much
easier to argue to a jury.
180. Even following the amendments, there are cases still being prosecuted where the actor is not four
years older than the minor in question. In one such case a defendant was first arrested for third degree
sexual assault, but the charge was deliberately changed to one of indecent liberties when it was found
that because of his youth, his conduct did not fit within the parameters required by section 6-2-304. The
defendant eventually pled guilty to a charge of "child endangerment." Telephone Interview with Scott
"Mitch" Guthrie, Assistant Public Defender, Cheyenne, Wyo. (November 25, 1998).
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ficity from the state's legislature. The United States Supreme Court recognized the critical nature of a judicial check on legislative authority transference in the area of criminal offenses in Dunn v. United States. The Court
announced, "thus to ensure that a legislature speaks with special clarity
when making the boundaries of criminal conduct, courts must decline to
impose punishment for actions that are not 'plainly and unmistakably' proscribed."', If criminal acts are not explicitly proscribed, states risk prosecutions based not upon the act in question but upon the identity or status of the
actor who committed it. The Wyoming Supreme Court, perhaps in recognition of this danger, stated in a Sorenson footnote that, "although legislation
must of necessity often use words of a general nature and need not be unduly precise, the questions of vagueness in the area in which we are here
concerned could be reduced by more specificity in the language of the enactment.'82 Unfortunately, this nineteen-year-old footnote proclamation has
failed to prod Wyoming lawmakers into enacting material changes to the
language of section 14-3-105.
Wyoming's Age of Consent
In Wyoming, in contrast to several states, the legislature has seen fit to
keep the age of consent applicable to the sexual assault statutes at sixteen.""
In fact, during the 1997 legislative session a bill was sponsored that would
have raised the age of consent under section 6-2-304 to eighteen. The bill
failed." The Wyoming legislature obviously intends to indicate that a sixteen year old minor has the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse. Setting
the appropriate age of consent, even arguably incorrectly, is a legislative
function, not a judicial one and the majority in Piersonappeared cognizant
of that fact."'
However, the dissent's position in Pierson, which indicated a preference for a per se rule where sexual intercourse with a minor is considered a
criminal violation, is a legitimate one. Consistency within areas of the law,
if nothing else, means a minor under the age of eighteen should not be considered capable of giving informed consent to sexual intercourse, any more
than he is considered to have the capacity to contract to buy a used Volkswagen."16 Society is well-served by equalizing the age of consent and the age

181. Dunn v. United Stales, 442 U.S. 100, 113 (1979). This may be particularly crucial when legisla-

tors have, for the most part, little or no formal training in law. However, a legally educated judiciary has
the expertise to interpret, and the power to invalidate, any law created in violation of well-established
legal and constitutional principles.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1033 n.1 (Wyo. 1979).
WYo. STAT ANN. § 6-2-304 (Michie 1998).
Telephone Interview with Greg Phillips, state senator (August 27, 1998).
Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 1998).
Many states include an age differential within their sexual conduct statutes. Phipps, supra note
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of emancipation to recognize a lack of awareness of consequences that ha-

bitually defines the adolescent, especially the adolescent in the grip of burgeoning sexuality.
Several states, including California, have recently raised their ages of
consent to eighteen.'" The rationale behind this action is that it more adequately protects the state's children from adults who prey on minors by establishing a stiffer criminal penalty for the conduct.1' Proponents also argue
it protects the state's taxpayers from paying the full costs for care of the
children born of these unions.-' The California legislature, in enacting its
"Teenage Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1995" found and declared that:
Illicit sexual activity between adult males and teenage or younger
girls in this state is resulting in the nation's highest teenage pregnancy and birth rate. In California females under the age of 18 gave
birth to 28,065 children in 1994. Sixty-six percent of the fathers of
those children were adult males, and 10,786 of those fathers were
between the ages of 20 and 29 years .... In the United States, one
in every sixteen girls between the ages of 15 and 19 has a child ....
California spent $3.08 billion in 1985 to assist families headed by
teenagers. If those births had been delayed until the mothers were at
least 20 years old, the state would have saved $1.23 billion in welfare and health care expenses .... The laws prohibiting adults from
having sexual relations with a person under the age of 18 years
must be more vigorously enforced. Adult males who prey upon mi-

37, at 62. The purpose of the differential is to recognize the difference between a situation in which a
minor's youth, naivetd, and inexperience are being taken advantage of for the sexual gratification of one
older and more sophisticated, and a situation comprised of sexual experimentation between contemporaries--those whom most would see as appropriate companions. The Model Penal Code commentators
consider it "harsh and unreasonable" to punish a person for engaging in sexual activity with a willing
partner "whom society regards as a fit associate in a common educational or social endeavor." Model
Penal Code § 213.3 cmt. 2 at 386. The drafters of the MPC chose the four year age differential to reflect
the "prevailing pattern of secondary education." Id. A Wyoming Supreme Court majority found this
view illogical in relation to Wyoming's statutory rape statute. The court stated that the inability to give
consent was a substitute for force in the elements of the crime, and the age of the actor is not relevant to
the victim's capacity to give consent. The court stated, "in this respect the statute is internally inconsistent and irrational. It cannot be said to set forth a usable criminal violation more specific than does the
indecent liberties statute." MeArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288, 294 (Wyo. 1985).
187. Twelve states currently set their ages of consent at eighteen. Phipps, supra note 37, at 62. However, sixteen is still the most common age of consent. Id
188. There may be some logic in allowing the age of consent to marry with parental consent to remain
at sixteen. Arguably an adult willing to marry the minor is not "preying" on him/her and the State will
probably not be supporting the couple to the same extent it would had the adult chosen to leave. Further,
requiring the consent of the minor's parents would probably act as a sufficient check to the system.
189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1998). Califomia's Unlawful Sexual Intercourse with Person
Under 18 statute provides for civil penalties of up to $25,000 to be deposited into the state's Underage
Pregnancy Prevention Fund, if an adult over the age of twenty-one engages in unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under age sixteen. The civil penalties are not as great if the age differential between
the parties is more narrow.
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nor girls must be held accountable for their conduct and accept responsibility for their actions. It is the intent of the Legislature that
district attorneys vigorously investigate and prosecute adults guilty
of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, particularly where that
unlawful sexual intercourse results in pregnancy.'
If one follows the reasoning of the California Legislature, raising the age of
consent in Wyoming to eighteen would be beneficial.
Nevertheless, no matter which alternative the state's lawmakers
choose, whether it be 1) raising the age of consent under section 6-2-304 to
eighteen, or 2) lowering the age listed in the indecent liberties statute to
sixteen with a four year differential, the goal is simply to enact a more coherent and workable code of sex crimes statutes. This single legislative act
would virtually eliminate the anomalous results encapsulated in many
Wyoming cases.
The legislature could also easily abolish the constitutional due process
issues raised by the vagueness of section 14-3-105 by repealing it and replacing it with a statute that specifically describes the proscribed conduct.
For instance, adopting a crime of child sexual abuse. Which would provide
that an actor is guilty of child sexual abuse if the actor knowingly (i) engages in sexual contact, as defined by section 6-2-301(aXvi) with any child,
or (ii) inflicts sexual intrusion as defined by section 6-2-301(a)(vii)(A) and
(B) on any child. "Child" should be defined consistently with section 6-2304, and the age differential should also be included within the statute.''
CONCLUSION

Pierson's first impression issue of whether the consent of a sixteen
year-old victim is a defense to a charge of indecent liberties was decided
correctly by the Wyoming supreme court. The majority did an admirable
job in attempting to clarify the legislature's schizophrenic approach to offenses which proscribe sexual contact with minors. By applying the conflicting statutes in pari materia and attempting to harmonize them the court
came to the proper result on that issue. However, the Pierson decision failed
to alleviate the fundamental underlying due process problems associated
with the application of section 14-3-105. Further, in some respects the deci-

190. Id It is, of course, debatable whether the state's legislation can actually alter the conduct it
outlines so vigorously. Further, some commentators think the statute is merely an attempt to legislate
morality and enforce stereotypical views of women as passive participants in their own sexuality. See
Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., The Fourteenth Amendment,
and Protecting Women From Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1933 (1992).
191. See supra note 186.
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sion may even have exacerbated those constitutional issues. Since the enactment of section 14-3-105 in 1957, the Wyoming Supreme Court appears
to have given in to the very understandable temptation to affirm punishment
for conduct which is consistently repugnant and reprehensible, rather than
invalidate a statute which is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
separation of powers.1 92 This abdication of judicial responsibility, while succeeding in ensuring that defendants convicted of abominable acts are punished, has failed to uphold the spirit and principles of constitutional law.," If
the legislature fails in its mandated duty to enact a more explicit statute, the
Wyoming Supreme Court must recognize its judicial responsibility and refuse to continue to apply a statute that allows individual Wyoming prosecutors, judges, and juries to define criminal sexual offenses on an ad hoc basis.
LoRi L. BRAND

192. It is indisputable that most of the acts to which the statute has been applied are anything less than
heinous. Many of the state's indecent liberties cases, which do not address issues specifically covered
within this case note, include sex acts with children of such lurid and graphic detail that they are at times
disturbing even to read.
193. The U.S. Supreme Court recently stated, "[tihe basis of the terms of the provision [decency and
respect] are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a criminal statute or regulatory scheme, they
could raise substantial vagueness concerns." National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,
2179 (1998) (validating a law requiring that artistic grants be made by taking into account general standards of "decency" and "respect"). The court held "when the Government is acting as patron rather than
as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe." Id
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